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Résumé / Abstract 
 
Nous ￩tudions l’effet de la lib￩ralisation du commerce international sur la prolifération des 
marques étrangères sur le marché du pays domestique. Les entrepreneurs du pays domestique 
font leur choix entre la production des produits locaux et la distribution des produits étrangers. 
Suite à la baisse des coûts d’importation, les importateurs ￩largissent l’￩ventail des vari￩t￩s de 
produits  importés.  La  croissance  de  la  proportion  des  entrepreneurs  qui  se  contentent 
d’importer  entraine  la  croissance  des  marques  ￩trang￨res  sur  le  march￩  local,  ce  qui 
finalement réduit la taille de firmes importatrices. 
 
Mots clés : Marques étrangères, firmes aux produits multiples, entrepreneurs, 
libéralisation du commerce international. 
 
 
The purpose of this study is to illustrate, using a simple model of monopolistic competition 
with  multi-product  firms,  how  trade  liberalization  affects  the  degree  of  foreign  brand 
penetration. We model this in terms of the profit incentives for domestic entrepreneurs to 
choose to offer domestic brands or foreign (imported) brands, and to determine the range of 
varieties within each brand. As trade costs decrease, in the medium run the provider of each 
foreign brand will widen its range of varieties, while the provider of each domestic brand will 
narrow down its range of varieties. However, in the long run, more domestic entrepreneurs 
choose to become foreign brand providers and the range of each foreign brand becomes 
narrower, relative to the initial equilibrium. 
 
Keywords: Foreign brand penetration, multiproduct firms, entrepreneurs, 
trade liberalization, inverted J-curve effect. 
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Trade liberalization through economic integration and decreasing transport
and communication costs has resulted in increasing penetration of foreign
brands, a phenomenon that has raised concerns among domestic producers.1
In fact, in the wake of trade liberalization, there has been not only a prolifer-
ation of foreign brands, but also a widening of varieties within each imported
brand. This paper addresses both of these phenomena, using a simple model
of import penetration with competition among multi-product ﬁrms to anal-
yse short-run, medium-run, and long-run eﬀects of decreased trade costs on
product diversity (both in brand names and in varieties), relative prices, and
relative proﬁts.
While trade theory has until recently used the simplifying assumption
that each ﬁrm produces a single product, in practice a great deal of busi-
ness transactions across national borders are conducted by multi-product
ﬁrms. As Allanson and Montagna (2005) pointed out, ﬁrms can seek to
create and sustain segmented market structures by pursuing diﬀerentiation
strategies based on advertising, brand image, product design, styling, distri-
bution channels, credit facilities, service arrangements and other dimensions
of the total oﬀering to customers. With a pervasive globalization mood, these
tendencies are often observed for imported brands: since some speciﬁc prod-
ucts (e.g., French brands of perfume and wine, Italian brands of apparel)
are diﬀerentiated from similar brands from other countries, ﬁrms producing
(or importing) those products have stronger incentives to create and sustain
segmented market structures.
There are several approaches to the modelling of competition among
multi-product ﬁrms. While early contributions such as Ottaviano and Thisse
(1999), Ju (2003), and Allanson and Montagna (2005) modelled symmetric
multi-product ﬁrms, more recent research has explored models in which het-
erogeneous ﬁrms produce multiple products. For example, Bernard, Redding
1Another important aspect of foreign penetration is foreign direct investment. Ono
(1990) develops an oligopoly model to deal with this point.
3and Schott (2010) assume that ﬁrm- and variety-speciﬁc costs are random
and independent of each other, while Nocke and Yeaple (2006) assume that
products are symmetric within ﬁrms, but ﬁrms diﬀer in terms of organiza-
tional capability, which determines the rate at which the common marginal
cost for each product rises with the number of products. Eckel and Neary
(2010) consider a trade model of ﬂexible manufacturing where each ﬁrm faces
rising marginal costs as it oﬀers products further away from its “core com-
petence.”
Still, the literature ignores an important aspect of real life: foreign pro-
ducers and domestic sellers of foreign brands are often diﬀerent entities. For
example, cars are most often sold in local markets by dealers who are na-
tionals of the importing country. As another prime example, in the Japanese
apparel industry, companies such as C. Itoh and Mitsui have concentrated on
licensing high-quality European and US brands. In particular, there was a
large increase in the number of imported brands during the 1980s and 1990s.
Commenting on this trend, Porter, Takeuchi and Sakakibara (2000) state:2
The more agreements the Japanese rivals signed, frequently with
licensors based in the same countries, especially Italy, the more
similar they became. As a ﬂood of imported brands hit the
Japanese market, their appeal waned. In addition, the unprece-
dented boom in licensed imports coincided with the peak of the
bubble economy. The result: the race to sign licensing agreements
ultimately destroyed industry proﬁtability.
Related to these phenomena, in a recent inﬂuential survey, Rauch (2001)
argues that the diﬃculty of doing business across borders implies the vital role
of importers (i.e., intermediaries such as Japan’s sogo shosha), particularly
for trade in diﬀerentiated products.
These examples seem to suggest that the focus on the “multi-product”
nature of international trade should be accompanied by a focus on the be-
havior of domestic importing ﬁrms. In response to changes in trade costs,
2Porter, Takeuchi and Sakakibara (2000, p. 88).
4entrepreneurs have incentives to switch from providing domestic brands to
providing foreign brands, and to widen the range of varieties within each im-
ported brand. The present study is designed to capture this aspect of global
commerce.
The main purpose of this study is to illustrate, using a simple trade
model with multi-product ﬁrms operating under monopolistic competition,
how trade liberalization (i.e., a decline in trade costs) can aﬀect domestic
entrepreneurs’ decision on specializing in a domestic brand or a foreign brand,
as well as decision on the range of varieties within each brand. These decisions
determine the degree of foreign brand penetration. Generalizing key elements
of the models of Matsuyama (1995) and Allanson and Montagna (2005), we
assume that there are three levels of substitutability among diﬀerentiated
goods: at the level of varieties within each brand, at the brand level within
each group, and ﬁnally at the group level. There are two groups of brands
in the domestic market: domestic brands and foreign brands.3 Each brand
is managed in this market by a domestic entrepreneur. Following Allanson
and Montagna (2005), we assume that there are many diﬀerentiated varieties
within a brand. Both Matsuyama (1995) and Allanson and Montagna (2005)
assumed a closed economy. In contrast, in this study we focus on the case of
trade and examine the eﬀect of trade liberalization on entrepreneurs’ decision
concerning (1) what kind of brands (i.e., domestic or foreign) they provide,
and (2) the range of varieties for the chosen brand. The key aspect of the
present study is that these two decisions are made in diﬀerent time frames:
while the choice of brand (i.e., movement of entrepreneurs between domestic
and foreign groups) is made in the long run, the range of varieties within a
chosen brand can be changed even in the medium run.
On the basis of the model outlined above, this study demonstrates that,
as trade costs decrease, each foreign brand provider has stronger incentives
3Matsuyama (1995) considers only single-product ﬁrms in each of two industries, and
focus on the distinction between the intra-industry elasticity of substitution and the inter-
industry elasticity of substitution. Allanson and Montagna (2005) consider an industry
consisting of multi-product ﬁrms. These authors do not deal with international trade.
5to widen its range of varieties in the medium run. However, in the long run,
more entrepreneurs choose to switch to become foreign brand providers; con-
sequently, as competition among foreign brands themselves becomes tougher,
each foreign brand provider begins to cut back its range of varieties. We call
this phenomenon the inverted J-curve for the range of varieties within each
imported brand. Nevertheless, the response of relative price is monotone: a
permanent fall in trade costs by x per cent will lead in the medium run to
a fall in the relative price of imported goods by °x per cent, where ° > 1,
and the long run fall in relative price is by q°x per cent, where q > 1. The
main results of the present study, which characterise the pattern of foreign
brand penetration and the gradual shift of domestic entrepreneurs to foreign
brands, have not appeared in the existing literature.
Our paper is closely related to the literature on the role of entrepreneur-
ship in trading activities. In a seminal contribution, Bond (1987) developed a
two-sector model in which ﬁrms in one sector are heterogeneous due to diﬀer-
ences in the level of ability among entrepreneurs. In a similar vein, Schmitt
and Yu (2001) and Yu (2002) developed models with heterogeneous ﬁxed
export costs, which can be interpreted as diﬀerences in entrepreneurship.
A potentially related literature deals with the interaction between trade
liberalization and the retail market structure (Raﬀ and Schmitt 2005, 2006,
2009). While Raﬀ and Schmitt (2005, 2006) examine the eﬀects of trade lib-
eralization on markets where manufacturers have power over retailers, their
third paper studies the impact of trade liberalization using an oligopoly model
where retailers have market power over manufacturers. While we abstract
from the market structure of retailers, our monopolistic competition model
with multi-product ﬁrms are complementary to this literature in that we shed
new light on the level and the composition of imported/domestic brands.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section we present
a basic trade model of monopolistic competition with multi-product ﬁrms.
The market equilibrium is presented in Section 3. In Section 4, the impact
of trade liberalization is considered. Some concluding remarks are oﬀered in
6Section 5.
2 The Model
Suppose there are two countries, Home and Foreign. We assume that For-
eign is large and Home is small, so that actions in Home have no impact on
Foreign. This discussion will therefore concentrate on what happens in the
Home (domestic) market. In Home, there are M identical individuals, each
owning one unit of labor and N=M units of entrepreneurship. This implies
that there are N entrepreneurs in Home.4 The representative individual con-
sumes a numeraire good (good Z) and a collection of diﬀerentiated products.
Good Z is competitively produced under constant-returns-to-scale technol-
ogy: one unit of labor produces one unit of good Z (no entrepreneurship is
required in this sector). Thus the wage rate is unity.
On the other hand, the diﬀerentiated products, whether produced in
Home or imported from Foreign for distribution in Home, require entrepreneurs
who are residents of Home. Each ﬁrm needs exactly one entrepreneur. Then,
at any point of time, there are exactly N ﬁrms in the diﬀerentiated-good
sector in Home. Of these, nh ﬁrms produce, market, and distribute Home
brand-name products, while nf ﬁrms import Foreign brand-name products
from abroad and take care of their marketing and distribution in Home. Note
that nf = N ¡ nh. Entrepreneurs in the interval [0;nh] ´ Ih are called “do-
mestic producers” and entrepreneurs in the interval (N ¡ nf;N] ´ If are
called “importers/licensees.” We assume that Foreign produces a total of NF
brand-name products, where NF > N ¸ nf. In our model, NF is exogenous,
while nf and nh are endogenous.
Following Allanson and Montagna (2005), we suppose that each ﬁrm spe-
cializes in one brand name, and sells a continuum of varieties under that
brand name (Figure 1). An entrepreneur j 2 Ih oﬀers mh(j) varieties un-
4In what follows, the terms “an entrepreneur” and “one unit of entrepreneurship” are
used interchangeably.
7der a Home brand name j, and produces xh(jk) units of variety k under
that brand name, charging a price ph(jk) per unit. In xh(jk) or ph(jk),
the index k is a real number in the continuum [0;mh(j)]. Similarly, an im-
porter/licensee j0 2 If oﬀers mf(j0) varieties under a Foreign brand name j0,
and produces xf(j0k) units of variety k under that brand name j0, charging
a price pf(j0k) per unit. (We will delete the prime in j0 in what follows, to
simplify notation.)
Consider a representative individual resident in Home. Given any ex-
penditure level eh(j) allocated to the goods oﬀered by domestic producer
j 2 [0;nh], she would allocate it among various varieties so as to maximize









, ¾ > 1, (1)
where ¾ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties within
the same brand, and ch(jk) denotes consumption of a typical variety k under
brand name j.




























, ¾ > 1. (3)
Note that ph(j) is dual to sub-utility function ch(j).
Similarly, if the individual is to spend an amount Eh on diﬀerentiated
goods produced by domestic ﬁrms, she would allocate it among the domestic









, ® > 1. (4)



















Ch for all j 2 [0;mh], (5)








, ® > 1. (6)
Concerning the allocation among Foreign brand-name products, a similar













































, ® > 1. (9)
From equations (2) and (5), and their counterparts, equations (7) and (8),




















®¡1 Ei, i = h; f:
(10)
Thus, for a given Ei, the demand for each variety within a brand will depend
negatively on its price and positively on both the ﬁrm-level and group-level
price indices, if ¾ > ®.
Now let us turn to the allocation of the consumer’s budget between the
two aggregates Ch and Cf. Unlike the standard textbook monopolistic com-
petition model where consumers do not care whether a brand is foreign or
domestic, we assume that the substitutability between any two domestic
brands (or between any two Foreign brands) is closer than between a domes-
tic brand and a foreign brand. Furthermore, we assume that Home consumers
may have a bias for (or against) Foreign brand-name products. Assumptions
of this type have been made by a number of authors, for example Rauch and
Trindade (2009), Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2005, p. 88), and Warnock (2003).










;" > 0, (11)
where ah > 0, af > 0, ah + af = 1, and ² is the elasticity of substitution
between the domestic-brand aggregate and the foreign-brand aggregate, Ch

























´"¡1¸, i = h;j: (12)






















10where Ãf denotes the relative price of Foreign brand-name products, Pf=Ph.5
Equation (13) implies that the relative expenditure on group-h brands is
positively related to the preference parameter (ah=af) and positively related
to the relative price of Foreign brand-name products (Ãf ´ Pf=Ph). The
























Finally, the consumer must allocate her income, Y , between her expendi-
ture on the homogeneous good, z, and her expenditure E on the diﬀerentiated
good aggregate, C, deﬁned by equation (11). Let us deﬁne the price index














Then E = PC and the budget constraint becomes Y = z + PC. Here Y
is the sum of her labor income (which is unity) and the income from her
entrepreneurship.
In what follows, we assume for simplicity that the utility function is
u = z + logC; (16)
where z denotes the consumption of good Z. From equation (16) we obtain
u = z + logE ¡ logP. Maximizing utility subject to the budget constraint
5Note that the group price indices Ph and Pf reﬂect not only the price of individual
items but also the range of varieties available to consumers.
11E +z = Y , we obtain E = 1 (provided that Y > 1). That is, each individual
spends E = 1 on diﬀerentiated goods. Thus, Home’s aggregate expenditure
on diﬀerentiated goods, ME, is equal to the number of individuals, M. Our
speciﬁcation (16) allows us to focus on the eﬀect of trade liberalization on
the composition of demand within the diﬀerentiated good sector, abstracting
from inter-sectoral reallocation of total expenditure.
On the supply side of the model, in each group, diﬀerentiated products
are produced at constant marginal costs (and a ﬁxed cost) by monopolisti-
cally competitive ﬁrms. One of our central assumptions is that each brand
marketed in Home must be managed by a domestic entrepreneur located in
Home. Each domestic entrepreneur has to decide on what type of brand to
provide. There are two options: (1) to set up a domestic ﬁrm by hiring Home
labor at the wage rate wh = 1 and provide a domestic brand (i.e., to become a
“domestic producer”); or (2) to set up an intermediary and import a Foreign
brand for Home consumers (i.e., to become an “importer/licensee”). In the
latter case, Foreign brands are assumed to be produced in Foreign by hiring
Foreign labor at Foreign wage rate wf = 1. To simplify the argument, we
assume that wage rates are equalized between countries, and that domestic
ﬁrms in the diﬀerentiated good sector do not export.
Each entrepreneur also has to decide on the range of varieties oﬀered
within the chosen brand. Following Allanson and Montagna (2005), we as-
sume that there are ﬁxed costs per variety. The total cost function of a typical







; i = h; f;
where Ái is the ﬁxed cost per variety in group i, ¯i is the ﬁrm’s marginal
cost and xi(jk) is the output of variety k 2 [0; mi(j)]. In the case of Foreign
brands, Áf may be interpreted as a ﬁxed fee per variety of a given Foreign
brand which the Foreign brand owner charges the domestic importer/licensee.
123 Market Equilibrium
In what follows, we distinguish short-run, medium-run, and long-run market
equilibria. In the short run, both ni and mi(j) are constant. In the medium
run, while ni is constant, mi(j) is variable. And in the long run, the distri-
bution of entrepreneurs, nh and nf, is determined by Home entrepreneurs’
switching between occupations (domestic producer versus importer/licensee).
Assume that the shipment of goods to consumers incur a transportation
cost represented by the “iceberg” eﬀect: for a unit of good to reach a con-
sumer, ti units must be shipped. We assume that tf = t > 1 and th = 1, to
reﬂect the fact that cross-border shipping is relatively more expensive (es-
pecially when one takes into account delays due to customs inspection etc.).
Thus, to deliver cf(jk) units of a group-f variety, a ﬁrm in group f must ship
tfcf(jk) units of it. In contrast, to deliver ch(jk) units of group-h variety, a
ﬁrm in group h must ship ch(jk) units of it.
Given the demand functions in (10), since there are M consumers in
















¡¾ [½f(jk) ¡ ¯f]dk
!
¡Áfmf(j); (18)
where ½i(jk) is the mill price of variety k of ﬁrm j (i.e., brand-name j) in
group i.6 The price of imported brand for Home consumers will be
pf(jk) = tf½f(jk); j 2 If; k 2 [0; mf(j)]: (19)
6Recall our assumption that domestic ﬁrms in the diﬀerentiated good sector do not
export.
13A typical ﬁrm j in group i will optimally set the mill price for each of the






; 8k 2 [0; mi(j)]; 8j 2 Ii; i = h; f; (20)
where ¾=(¾¡1) is the mark-up factor over marginal cost. Based on this pric-
ing rule, the ﬁrm-level price index as in (3) becomes pi(j) = [mi(j)]
1=(1¡¾)pi(jk).
Using this and (20), the proﬁt functions, given that ﬁrms have set their prices

















®¡1 ¡ Áfmf(j): (22)
Assumption A1: The elasticity of substitution between any two varieties
within the same brand is greater than that between any two brands, which is
in turn greater that between Ch and Cf :
¾ > ® > " > 1:
Given Assumption A1, the proﬁt function for ﬁrm j in group i is strictly
concave in its range mi(j) of varieties within its brand name. Then proﬁt



























¡Áf = 0: (24)
The second order condition is satisﬁed since, by Assumption A1, ® < ¾ (i.e.,
there is greater substitutability between any two varieties within a brand
than between any two brands).
In a symmetric equilibrium, all ﬁrms within the same group will have the
same product range size (i.e., mi(j) = mi; 8j 2 Ii, i = h; f). This then









, i = h;f (25)
where th = 1 and tf = t. Substituting (25) into (23) and (24), these ﬁrst














; j 2 Ii; i = h; f: (26)
Thus, given ni, the equilibrium range of varieties oﬀered by a ﬁrm within
a group is proportional to the expenditure level on the group’s products.
Notice that while t does not appear explicitly in equation (26), it inﬂuences
mi indirectly via its eﬀect on Ei (and also, in the long run, on ni). This will
become clearer in the next section.
Let us denote by rf the ratio mf to mh (the representative importer/licensee’s
range of product varieties relative to that of a domestic producer), and by
sf the ratio of nf to nh (the number of Home entrepreneurs who choose to
be importer/licensee relative to that of domestic brand producers). We may
call rf the “relative breadth” of an imported brand, and sf the “relative




























































Let the hat denote the percentage change, i.e., b x ´ (1=x)dx for any variable
x. Then, from (27),
b rf = ¡
(" ¡ 1)(¾ ¡ 1)
¾ ¡ "
b t ¡
(® ¡ ")(¾ ¡ 1)
(® ¡ 1)(¾ ¡ ")
b sf: (28)
15Equation (27) implies that rf is decreasing in sf. Intuitively, the more im-
porter/licensees there are, the weaker is the incentive for each of them to
oﬀer a wide range of varieties. Then, when t falls (i.e. b t < 0), in the
medium run (i.e., sf is constant), each existing importer/licensee tends to
increase its range of varieties. But in the long run, this tendency will be
dampened because of the (trade-liberalization-induced) increase in sf. The
precise extent of this dampening eﬀect will be computed in the next sec-
tion. In equation (28), the term ¡(" ¡ 1)(¾ ¡ 1)=(¾ ¡ ") may be called
the medium run elasticity of rf with respect to trade costs, and the term
¡(® ¡ ")(¾ ¡ 1)=[(® ¡ 1)(¾ ¡ ")] is the elasticity of rf with respect to sf.
Substituting (26) and (25) back into the proﬁt functions in (21) and (22),
we obtain the expression for the equilibrium proﬁt ¼¤
i(after optimization of
each ﬁrm with respect to its mi(j)) of a representative ﬁrm in group i, given












; i = h; f: (29)





















































in (30) is endogenous in the medium run, we can replace






















The relative proﬁt of the group of licensees is thus negatively related to the
group’s relative size, sf.7
7See Matsuyama (1995, p. 714) on this point.
16In the long run, the number of ﬁrms is determined by the switching of
entrepreneurs across groups.8 We suppose that such switching ensures that
proﬁts in the long run are equalized between groups,
˜ ¼h = ˜ ¼f; (32)
where the “tilde” indicates the long-run equilibrium value. Using (31) and
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Proposition 1: In the long run, the relative size of group-f ﬁrms (e sf) is
positively related to its relative attractiveness (af=ah) and negatively related
to trade costs, t.
This implies that if there is a strong preference in favor of domestically
provided brands or/and if trade costs are high, the rate of foreign brand
penetration will be low.
4 Trade Liberalization: Eﬀects of a Perma-
nent Fall in Trade Costs
Suppose that the system is initially at a long run equilibrium, with trade costs
t > 0. Consider now a permanent reduction in trade costs: a decrease in t.
We consider (a) the short-run eﬀect [both ni and mi(j) are held constant
at the initial long run equilibrium], (b) the medium-run eﬀect [while ni is
constant, mi(j) is variable], and (c) the long-run eﬀect [both ni and mi(j)
are variable], respectively.
8Recall that total number of domestic entrepreneurs is ﬁxed at N.
174.1 Eﬀects on the relative price and the relative breadth
of group-f ﬁrms
To see the impact of trade liberalization, let us consider the relative price of























b rf + ˆ t; (36)
where the “hat” indicates a percentage change. From this equation, in the
short run, if the trade costs fall by x per cent, then the relative price Ãf will
fall by x per cent:
b ÃfjSR = ˆ t (37)
where the notation SR signiﬁes the short run, meaning that mi and ni are
kept ﬁxed.
In the medium run (MR), combining (28) with (36), the relative price
Ãf will fall by more than x per cent when the trade costs fall by x per
cent (because each existing importer/licensee begins to oﬀer a wider range
of varieties):













where we have used the fact that sf is constant in the medium run, so that
(28) gives
b rfjMR = ¡
(" ¡ 1)(¾ ¡ 1)
¾ ¡ "
ˆ t.
Let us turn to the long run (LR) adjustment. In the long run, the ratio
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b rfjLR + ˆ t: (38)
18Here, the long-run adjustment in the relative breadth (rf ´ mf=mh) plays
an important role. From equation (28) and (34),
b rfjLR = ¡
(" ¡ 1)(¾ ¡ 1)
¾ ¡ "
b t ¡
(® ¡ ")(¾ ¡ 1)
(® ¡ 1)(¾ ¡ ")
b sf
= ¡
(" ¡ 1)(¾ ¡ 1)
¾ ¡ "
b t +
(® ¡ ")(¾ ¡ 1)
(® ¡ 1)(¾ ¡ ")
·
(¾ ¡ 1)(" ¡ 1)(® ¡ 1)




(" ¡ 1)2 (¾ ¡ 1)
(¾ ¡ ")2 ˆ t: (39)
This implies that, in the long run, a fall in trade costs will reduce rf. Thus
we can state the following interesting results:
Proposition 2 (The inverted J-curve) In the long run, a permanent fall
in trade costs result in the reduction of the relative breadth of an imported
brand, rf, even though in the medium run the eﬀect is in the opposite direc-
tion.
The importance of this Proposition cannot be overemphasized. When
t falls, in the medium run, each existing importer/licensee tends to increase
its range of varieties. But, in the long run, this tendency will be reversed
because of the increase in nf=nh.
Now return to the change in the relative price. Substituting (39) into
(38), we can obtain the following:
b ÃfjLR =
·
(¾ ¡ 1)(" ¡ 1)




(¾ ¡ ")2ˆ t + ˆ t
=
½
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where the term inside f:::g exceeds unity because ¾ ¡ " > ® ¡ " > 0 and
¾ ¡1 > " ¡1. Thus in the long run, the relative price Ãf falls by more than
x per cent when the trade costs fall by x per cent.
19Let us compare the medium-run eﬀect with the long-run eﬀect on the
relative price.















(" ¡ 1)(¾ ¡ 1)
¾ ¡ "
b t ¡
(® ¡ ")(¾ ¡ 1)










(® ¡ ")(¾ ¡ 1)


















b sf + b ÃfjMR
It follows that









Thus, a permanent fall in trade costs, i.e. ˆ t < 0, which increases sf (by
Proposition 1), implies that the right-hand side of equation (41) is negative.
We record this result in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 (Monotone fall of the relative price)The long-run per-
centage fall in the relative price Ãf in response to a permanent x per cent
fall in trade cost is larger (in absolute value) than its medium-run percentage
fall.
Remark: Since the price indices Ph and Pf reﬂect not only the prices of
individual items but also both the number of brands and the range of varieties
within each brand, available to consumers, the above result indicates that
the expansion in the number of foreign brands more than compensate for the
inverted J-curve eﬀect in Proposition 2.
4.2 Eﬀects on proﬁts
In order to examine the impact of trade liberalization, it is also useful to
check the proﬁt level of each ﬁrm (¼h and ¼f). Rewriting (29), and using

























Given that both ni and mi are constant in the short run, changes in
short-run proﬁt levels in response to a change in trade costs come only via











































where we have made use of the fact that E = 1, regardless of t, a feature
implied by our speciﬁcation of the utility function (16). Via expenditure
shifting from domestic brands toward imported ones, a reduction in trade
costs increases the proﬁt levels of ﬁrms in group f, while reducing the proﬁt
levels of group-h ﬁrms. From equations (44) and (45), we can state the
following result:
Proposition 4: In the short run, a fall in trade costs will result in an
increase in each group-f ﬁrm’s proﬁt and a decrease in each group-h ﬁrm’s
proﬁt. The ratio of the increase in ¼f to the decrease in ¼h is proportional
















In the medium run, with nf and nh remaining ﬁxed, the expenditure-
shifting to imported brands induces changes in the range of varieties within
21brand name. Since Ef becomes larger while Eh becomes smaller, each im-
porter/licensee widens its range of varieties (mf becomes larger) while each
domestic ﬁrm narrows its range of varieties [see (27)]. Thus, trade liber-
alization induces asymmetric responses in the breadth of varieties.9 It is
important to note, from (36), this medium-run changes also increases the
relative price of Home brand-name products (making them less attractive)
which reinforces the short-run impact of trade liberalization. Group-h ﬁrms’
proﬁts are further reduced by changes in ranges of their varieties, which is a
natural consequences of the inverted J-curve eﬀect in Proposition 2.
Proposition 5: In the medium run, the eﬀect of trade liberalization on rel-
ative proﬁt of importer/licensee ﬁrms is magniﬁed via the widening of range
of varieties of each imported brand and the narrowing of range of varieties




















































< 0: ¥ (47)
In the long run, entrepreneurs move from group h to group f. These
movements tend to reduce the proﬁt of each importer/licensee ﬁrm. At the
new long-run equilibrium, equation (32) will be hold again. Note that the
9From (31), the magnitude of the medium-run change of relative proﬁt is increasing
in ", the elasticity of substitution between the domestic brand aggregate and the foreign
brand aggregate.
22proﬁts at the new long-run equilibrium are the same as at the initial long-
run equilibrium. This is because the sum of proﬁts is depends only on E,
which itself it constant because of our speciﬁcation of the utility function
(16). Indeed, from (42) and (43),









So far, we have restricted attention to a permanent fall in trade costs, from a
high level to a permanent low level. However, our analysis also allows us to
infer results about gradual trade liberalization. By combining Propositions
1, 4, and the above result, one can examine the short/long-run impacts of
gradual trade liberalization. Suppose that trade costs decline from t to t0
ﬁrst, then from t0 to t00, and so on. As the share of imported brands increases
due to trade liberalization (Proposition 1), the short-run impact of trade
liberalization itself becomes smaller (Proposition 4). This implies that, as
trade is gradually liberalized, the incentive for entrepreneurs to switch to
provide additional imported brands becomes weaker: as a ﬂood of imported
brands hits the domestic market, their appeal wanes.
Proposition 6: Suppose that trade liberalization proceeds gradually in equal
steps. Then, as trade is liberalized further, the incentive for entrepreneurs
to switch to the status of importer/licensee to provide additional imported
brands becomes smaller.
Figure 2 summarizes the discussion of this section. The horizontal axis
shows the relative size of group-f ﬁrms (sf), while the vertical axis shows
the relative proﬁt level (¼f=¼h). Given that ¾ > ® > " and mi is constant,
the relative proﬁt level is shown as a downward-sloping curve [see, (31)].
With trade liberalization, the downward sloping curve moves upwards. The
short-run equilibrium moves from point E to point I0. Then, in the medium
23run, each ﬁrm responds by changing its range of varieties: this medium-
run impact is shown by a movement from I0 to I00 (Proposition 5), which
is the reﬂection of the inverted J-curve eﬀect in Proposition 2. Finally, the
entrepreneurs gradually switch away from group h and the condition (32)
holds again: the new long-run equilibrium is obtained at E0.
Before closing this section, we would like to emphasize that the “for-
eign brand penetration” phenomenon that results from trade liberalization
has two facets. On the one hand, in the medium run, each existing im-
porter/licensee ﬁrm has incentives to increase the range of its own varieties:
consumers can purchase wider range of existing Foreign brand-name varieties.
On the other hand, in the long run, the number of brand names itself increases
as a result of domestic entrepreneurs’ switching behavior. Then, since com-
petition between imported brands becomes tougher, each importer/licensee
begins to cut back on its own range of varieties. It is important to note
that the process of foreign brand penetration is not monotone: the inverted
J-curve is the outcome of the interaction between the medium-run response
in product varieties within each brand, and the long-run responses of en-
trepreneurial switching across groups. Given that ﬁrms can change the range
of varieties within each brand, the process of foreign brand penetration be-
haves in a complex way. In other words, diﬀerences in time frame between
the range of varieties within each brand and the choice of brand itself become
the source of the non-monotone outcome.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this study, by constructing a simple monopolistic competition trade model
with multi-product ﬁrms, we have highlighted the role of domestic entrepreneurs’
decision as a driving force behind a gradual foreign brand penetration. It
has been shown that, as trade costs become lower, each importer/licensee
chooses to broaden its range of products in the medium run. However, in
the long run, since more and more domestic entrepreneurs choose to become
24importer/licensee, the relative range of Foreign brand-name products will
be narrower (Proposition 2: the inverted J-curve eﬀect). The relative price
response is monotone, despite the inverted J-curve eﬀect. Concerning rela-
tive proﬁts, while the widening of range of existing imported brands in the
medium run magniﬁes the short-run impact of trade liberalization (Proposi-
tion 5), the short-run impact of trade liberalization itself becomes smaller as
more entrepreneurs switch to foreign brands (Proposition 6). We would like
to emphasize that the process of foreign brand penetration is non-monotone:
the interaction between the medium-run response (cutting/expanding the
range of varieties) and the long-run response (entrepreneurs’ switching be-
tween groups) plays an important role in determining the impact of trade
liberalization.
These conﬂicting eﬀects of trade liberalization have not appeared in theo-
retical studies. This seems to suggest that incorporating multi-product ﬁrms
operated by domestic entrepreneurs might be a fruitful way to deepen our
understanding of the impacts of trade liberalization.
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